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ABSTRACT 
How inariy  wil1  coine?  Thousands, inillions? Does  Europe iiccd  a New Iron 
Cuitain?  These  qucstioiis  doniinate  tlie  origoiiig  negotiations  of  the  East 
Enlaigements  of tlie  Euiopeail  Uili011 (EU)  Wcsteiii  Euiopeans  are afraid  of 
beiiig o\citlowcd by cheap(ei) easteril Euiopeaii labouieis  It is fearcd that tlie 
ieii~oval  o1 barrieis to  inigratioil would lead to a iliass  exodus fioin eastern to 
wcstciii Euiope  In this article. I diaw a paiallel bctween the soutlicily ciilaigc- 
iiieilt of  the EU aiid thc EU cast enlargemeiit witli respect to inigratioii  Theii, I 
~indei-take  an econoinetiic estimate of South-North iuigiatiou flows and assumc 
tliat  the  cstiinatcd  paiainctcrs  are  of  exeinplary  sigilificaiice  for  the  easterii 
cnlaigement of the EU  As a result of soinc siinulatioi~  cxciciscs niy calculations 
advocate that iathei modest imii~igrailt  flows fiom Eastern Europe have to be 
expected iii the EU, ii fiee inobility of  laboui  was allowcd today 
This paper is part of the HWWA rescarc progiaiiiine  "Intciuatioi~al  Mobility of 
Fiiins and Workers" I.  INTRODUCTION 
The closer the Ceiitral aiid Eastern Europeaii countries (CEEC) get, 
tlie Iiotter becoiiies tlie issue: How iiiaiiy wil1 collie? Thousailds, iiiil- 
lions? Does Europe need a iiew Iron Cui-taiii? These q~iestioiis  doiiii- 
nate  the  oiigoiiig  iiegotiatioiis  of  tlie  East  Eiilai-geineiit  of  tlie 
Europeaii Uiiioii (EU). Western  Europeaiis are afraid of beiug over- 
flowed by cheap(er) easteni Europeaii laboui-ers. It is feared that tlie 
reinoval of barriers to inigration would lead to a inass exodus froin 
eastei-ii to westerii  Europe. It  is  sti-essed that  this  "trek  westwards" 
would place severe ecoiiomic aiid great political straiiis oii the west- 
ern  Europeaii target  counti-ies. "Wage  duinpiiig"  is tlie  sayiiig that 
goes iii Austria aiid Geilnaiiy to iiiobilize political pressure agaiiist a 
free inoveineiit of persons froiii Easterii Europe. 
Aiid  iiideed, the East-West migration potential  seems to be sub- 
staiitial. Tliere is iio doubt at al1 that the staiidard of liviiig, the aver- 
age per capita incoine aiid tlie wages are mucli lower iii tlie CEEC. 
Accordiiig to  soine guesstiinates  the inigration  flows  froiii  Central 
aiid Easteili to Western Europe could go up to inore than  10 iiiillion 
people (see Fir~ancicrl  Tinqes Dezltschlnnd 2000). Newer assessiiieiits 
reveal  iiiore  modest  figures  iii  the  inagnitude  of  about  4  inillion 
iinniigrants fsom Eastem Europe to  tlie  old EU countries.  Most oi 
tlieiii (i.e. about 3 out of 5)  inight go to Geiliiaiiy  (for an overview 
see Snclzverst~iirzdige~~rnt  2000: 156). 
More receiitly, the politica1 discussion aiid tlie  academie debale 
as wel1 have gaiiied botli inoineiituin aiid rougliiiess (see Brfielter 
(2001),  Flaig  (2001)  and  tlie  coiniiieiits  by  Dustiiiaiiii  (2001)). 
Dustniaiiii (2001) argues that according to the uiiderlayiiig assusnp- 
tions  aiid  tlie  inodel  specification  aliiiost  every  magnitude  of  a 
iiiigratioii potential could be estiinated and coiisequently, tliat such 
guesstimates are inappropriate  for a political  debate aiid tliat  tliey 
iiiight even be daiigerous due to tlie fact tliat tliey could be inisused 
for populistic  headliiies  (lik tlie  olie iii the  Welt crin  Sonr?tng of 
April  22,  2001:  ,,Deutsclilaiid  erwartet  bis  ZLI  seclis  Millioiieii 
Zuwanderer - Forscli~liigsinstitute  sagen  grosse  Migratioiiswelle 
iiacli EU-Erweiterung  voraus").  1 tliink that Dustinaiin  is right  in 
his  aiialysis  (that every forecast  is  assuiiiptioii driven). But  I  aiii 
more optimistic than Dustinanii witli regard to tlie political usef~il- 
ness of s~ic1-i  guesstiinates. Tlie different forecasts have iiiitiated  a 
fruitf~~l  coiitroversy  about tlie  optimal research design. My coiitri- butioii is iiiteiided to add soiiie inore arguiiieiits to tlie ongoiiig dis- 
cussion. 
Of course, it reiiiains aii open questioii, whetlier the right of a free 
inoveineiit  towards  tlie  West  wil1  stilnulate  substalitial  East-West 
inigratioii Ilows. But iiidependently of tlie different assumptioii aiid 
iiiodels that liow been used to forecast poteiitial East-West iiiigratioii 
flows, sliould we expect froiii a t1~eoi.eticcrl  perspective  that  a free 
inoveiiieiit of persons leads to inore os less inigration within an iiite- 
grated  (aiid  eiilarged)  Eui-opeaii labour marltet?  Tlie  aiiswer  is  "it 
depeiids" as I wil1 deiiioiistrate in tlie next sectioii 11. Could we learri 
sometliiiig  fsoin  the  emnpiriccrl  experieiice  of tlie  Coininoii Labour 
Markets iii the EEC (EC, EU)? The answer is "of  course".  The his- 
torical experieiice of the EU gives us a very clear pichire of the rela- 
tioiiship  betweeii  ecoiioinic iiitegration  and iiiigratioii  (see  sectioiis 
I11 to V). Could we even get a wel1 based expectatioii o11  the poten- 
tial inigration effects  iii  a EU eiilarged by some Eastesn European 
couiitries? Agaiii tlie answer is a clear "yes"  as sectioii V1 wil1 show. 
Sectioii V11 provides soine conclusions. 
11.  MIGRATION  AND  INTEGRATION:  SOME  THEORETICAL 
EXPECTATIONS 
The ti7eoretical roots of the Europeaii integratioii process have lain iii 
the raisiiig literature oii "secoiid best sol~~tioiis"  iii the mid-1950ies that 
are related to naines lilte Leopold Kalir, Jacob Viiier, Jaines Meade aiid 
Richard Lipsey. It was thouglit that free trade within soine relatively 
siinilar couiitries iii close geographic proxiinity would act as a perfect 
substikite for cross-border iiioveiiients  of worlters. Consequeiitly  the 
politica1 inessage of the fifties was simple and clear: Integrate natioiial 
econoiiiies iiito regioiial Coininoil Marl~ets,  open up natioiial borders 
to trade of goods and there wil1 be no iiiigratioii! 
This  Itiiid  of  thinking  was  theoretically  s~ipported  by  the  very 
faiiious  neo-ciassical  nzodels  of  tlie  Heckscher-Oliliii-Saiiiuelsoii 
(H-O-S) type that are developed by Eli Hecltscher, Bertil Ohliii aiid 
Paul Sainiilesoii. One of tlie iron  pillars  of the H-O-S model  is tlie 
factor pi-ice  equcrlisation theorem. It predicts basically that withiii a 
perfect H-O-S world there is iio need for intei-natioiial capital mobil- 
ity and migration because "trade does the job"  to allocate efficiently 
econoniic ativities. 1) Accordiiig to the i~eo-clcrssicnl  >~,orld  of'thiiikiiig labour inigratioii 
is  a  rather  teiiiporary  arbitrage plieiioinenoii.  Worlters  inigrate 
froni regioiis  wit11  abuiidailt  labour  aiid  coiisequently  relatively 
low wages to  places  with  scarce labour  aiid  coiisequeiitly rela- 
tively  higher  wages.  Migration,  trade  aiid  iiiteriiational  capita1 
flows are more or less substitutive insti-uiiieiits to push econoiiiies 
towards  their  (long run) equilibrium aiid to reach the efficiency 
benchinark of iieo-classica1 ecoiioinics, that is the equalisatioii of 
goods and factor prices. 
However,  tlie  basic  ileo-classica1 tlieory  and  most  of  its  inore 
advaiiced exteilsions rely oii a set of relatively rigid assuinptions. 
Tliere is the assitinption of inore or less identical production func- 
tioiis, of liornogeneity of tlie prod~ictioil  factor labour or tlie belief 
that inarkets iioniially clear aiid reach a stable equilibriuin witli no 
uneinployinent. It is  alco  assuiiied  that  transpoi-t or traiisactioii 
costs and extei~ialities  are negligible. 
2)  Iii more advanced inodels of iiiterilational  transactions [allowing 
for persisteiit iiiternatioiial differeiices in productioii technology, 
increasiiig retunis to  scale (includiiig positive  or iiegative exter- 
ilalities of production) and the existeiice of non coinpetitive inar- 
kets], migratioii is much more than a short run arbitrage phenoin- 
enoii. 
In this world of tliinkiiig [tliat actually goes back to the fainous 
coiitributioiis  by  Myrdal  ((1956)  aiid  (1957))  and  Hirschinaii 
(1958) and that has hirther be elaborated by the New Growth the- 
ory a la Lucas (1988) and Romer ((1986), (1987), (1990)) inigra- 
tioii inight lead to cz/mzllative cnz~sation.  Tlie inore inobile factors 
of productioii iii a technologically disadvantaged locatioii are, tlie 
lower are the inonetary iiiceiitives  to invest in location-specific, 
iiiiniobile factors. If in tlie  extreiiie case  al1 input factors were 
inobile, tlie disadvaiitaged  locatioii would in the long ruil face a 
total outflow of pi-oductioii factors, uiitil  "the  last tuins off  tlie 
light". This is tlie wel1 kiiown "inezzogioino"  core-yeriphery pai- 
teril  with  a  growing  ceiitre  and  ai1  ecoiioinically  slowly dying 
outer  area.  Iii  sucli  a  diverging  (Ricardian)  world,  trade  and 
migration inight become iiiutually coinpleinentary. 
Thus,  the  tlieoretical  assuinptions  about  the  relatioiisliip  between 
trade aild iiitegration is iiot clear cut. Much inore it depeilds on tlie ~nodel  tliat  uiiderlies the ailalysis. To  make short a long theoretica1 
debate  betweeii  protagoiiists  of  71eo-classica1 coni~erge/.iee  aiid  of 
Ricnidiarl  divelgenee  argumeilts, it  miglit  be  a  good idea  to  sum- 
iilarise tlie mail1 issues iii a nutsl-iell. Therefore, iiiteriiatioiial migra- 
ti011  caii be tlie coilsequence of different sources: 
1)  Labour inobility cal1 be a reaction to existilig trade iinpediinents 
or  a  reactioil  to  the  physical  ilon-tradability  of  certain  goods 
which preveilt  "goods  for goods"  trade. In tlie abseilce of coin- 
modity trade, emigratioii froiii the labour-abuiidaiit country would 
reduce factor price disparities, thereby driving coininodity prices 
togetl-ier and reducing the basis for international coininodity trade. 
In this seilse, inteinational labour migratioii is a substitute, wliole 
os partial, for intenlational coininodity trade. Actually tliis argu- 
ment lias been fi~rther  developed by the 1999-Nobel price winiler 
Robei-t A. Mundell in a patli-brealtiiig article iil  1957 -  the bisth 
year of the EEC (see Muiidell (1957)). 
2)  Labour inobility caii be a reaction to tlle existence of iiitersectorally 
iinmobile  factors (as in the so called specific-factors iliodels).  Iii 
this  case,  internatioilal  labour  inigration  is  a  substitute  for  an 
iiliperfect inter-sectoral factor inobility withiii a giveii country and 
it taltes place as loiig as intei-natioilal trade aiid capita1 flows theiii- 
selves do not produce factor-price equalisatioil. Thus, internatioilal 
coininodiíy trade plus intematioiial labour inigratioil causes factor 
price equalisatioii, regardless of eiidowinent differences aild factor 
iiitensity  reversals. Intei-natioiial labour migration allows intenia- 
tioiial  coininodity trade to substitute completely for botli iiitenla- 
tioiial capital moveiiients aild tlie moveinents of sector-specific fac- 
tors  (equivaleiitly,  inteniatioiial  coininodity  trade  allows 
iilteri~atioilal  labour  inigratioil  to  substihite  for  capita1 inobility). 
3)  Labour inigration inay reflect  a reactio11 to iiltei~latioilal  differ- 
eiices in labour productivity due to tlie persisteilee of internatioii- 
ally different productioii technologies, tlie existence of ii~creasing 
ecoiloinies of scale os imperfect inarltets. If tliis internatioilal real- 
location of labour increases the degree of coinparative advaiitage, 
cominodity trade wil1 also be stiin~ilated.  111  that case, comiiiodity 
trade arid interi~atioiial  labour inigration are coiilpleinei~ts  rather 
thaii substihites. 
4)  If highly developed and specialised ecoiioiilies experieilce asyrii- 
metric macroecoilomic  shocks, labour inobility  can be an effec- tive  aiid efficieilt  short-1x111 adjustineiit iiiecliailisin  avoidiiig per- 
sisteiit uileinployineiit  iiicreases and structural probleiiis.  111  this 
case, inigration colrects for trade aild iiitenial labour inarket iiief- 
Iiciencies. 
111  the cases  1) aiid 2) tlie iiitei~lational  movement of wol-ltcrs is a sub- 
stitute for a trade iii coininodities where this is prohibited by law or 
reiidered iiiipossible by techilical factors. In cases 3) aiid 4) tlie inter- 
ilatioiial mobility of labour aild intei~latioilal  trade teild to be comple- 
ineiltary ratlier than substihltive. Basically, a nuinber of f~~iidailieiital 
coiiclusioils stem froin integratioil tl-ieoiy: 
1) A Single Marltet (includiilg a Comiiioil Labour Marltet) opeils up 
aiid- deregulates  inarkets. It  creates a high degree of legal cer- 
taiilty aiid clear rules for ini~er-Coiilinunity  trailsactions -  partic- 
ularly for the protection  of property rights, the rights of share- 
holders  aiid,  thus,  for  direct  iilvestinents.  Obstacles  to 
iniier-Coinmunity trade in goods tllus  disappear. Bilt  above al1 
the  rislts  of  iiiiier-Comiii~iiiity capital  transfers  are  reduced. 
Because the trailsactioil costs for trade in goods aild moveinents 
of capital  are as  a  rule  lower thail  those  for tlie  migratioli of 
labour, trade aild direct investinents  are liltely to f~~ilction  to a 
large extent as a substitute for the inigratioil of workers. 111  as far 
as there is a coinpleinentary relationship between  capital trans- 
fers  aild  migration,  direct  investnieilts  and  the  inigratioil  of 
-  labour are ilecessary iil order to exploit the advailtages of a coin- 
inon market. In this case, however, it is usually a question of the 
inigratioil  of highly  qualified  specialists  and ilot  of the  inass 
inigration of uiisltilled worlters, who doininate tlie picture iil the 
ilegative expectatioiis. 
2)  A coinmoil intemal inarltet supports efficieiicy and thus stimulates 
ecoiloinic  growtli.  On average, the  geileral  ecoiloinic  situatioii 
iinproves  rapidly  aiid  decisively,  which  has  a  strong  ii~hibitory 
effect on migration. 
3) We  iniglit  also  expect  that  siinply  tlie  prospect  of  having  the 
opportunity at a later date to be able to inigrate within a coininon 
inteinal inarket at aiiy time, as loiig as a job is available, reduces 
present iiidividual readiiless to inigrate q~iite  decisively (tliis is tlie 
concept  of  the  ,,option  value  of  waitiilg"  developed by  Burda 
(1995). The discussion  i11  this  sectioii was  iiiteiided  to  iiiake olie  poiiit  as 
cleai- as possible: Tlie relatioiisliip between iiiigratioii and iiitegration 
witliin a coiiiiiion laboui- marltet is theoretically iiot self evident. Tlie 
theoretica1 coiitroversy is the coiisequeiice of different assuiiiptioiis: 
1) If we live in a H-O-S world of inore os less sirnilai- ecoiioiiiies, 
iiiigratioii is a teiiiporary phenoiiieiioii of adjustinent oii tlie patli 
towards a coiivergiiig equilibriuru. 
2)  Tf  we live in a Ricardiaii world of ratlier differeiit economies (witli 
regai-d to  techiiology  or  developineiit),  inigratioii  is  a  dyiiainic 
self-feediiig  cuiiiulative  process  tliat  leads  towards  a  divergiiig 
polarisiiig core-peripliery patterii of developinent. 
Beca~~se  the H-O-S and tlie Ricardian view of tlie world are both the- 
oretically coiisistent, it becoiiies a q~~estioii  of eiiipirical experience iii 
which world we really live (in Europe). Conseq~leiitly,  I turn now to 
soine empirica1 evideiice for the qiiestioii wlietlier free iiioveiiieilt of 
persoiis lias iiicreased iiiigratioii or iiot. 
TIT.  MIGRATION  AND  INTEGRATION:  SOME  EMPIRICAL 
EXPERIENCE 
Froin tlie very begiiiiiiiig of tlie Europeaii iiitegration process, i.e. iii 
1957, tlie freedom of workers has been ai1 integral constitutional pai-t 
of  the Europeaii  Ecoiioinic Area  (EEA). Article  48 of the origiiial 
EEC Treaty of Rome of 25 March  1957 stipulated tliat "freedom  of 
iiioveinent for worlters"  entailed tlie "abolition of aiiy discriinination 
based  oii  natioiiality  between  worlters  of  tlie  member  states  as 
regards einployinent, reinuiieration and other coiiditions of work aiid 
einployineiit". Consequently, the Single Marltet has lowered transport 
aiid traiisaction costs for trade in goods aiid inovements of production 
factors. Worlters witli a passpoi-l of a couiltry of the European Uiiioii 
(EU) are allowed to i-iiove without aiiy substaiitial legal restrictioiis 
froiii one couiltry to al1 other meiiiber states -  siinilai- to inoveiiients 
withiii  a  couiitry. After  tlie  Europeaii  Legal Court has  talteil  some 
path-brealcing decisioiis in the early 90ies, the right of free moveinent 
witliiii  the EEA lias  been  eiilarged  froiii  "worlters"  to  "people"  in 
general. As long  as people  are able to live oii their  owii  fiiiaiicial 
resources  (or  by  social  traiisfers  froiii  countries  where  they  have worked  before)  tliey  are  free  to  iliove  aiid  to  stay  without  legal 
restrictioiis iii the wliole EEA. 
The fl-ee inoverneiit of persons was and is olie of the lasting ai~d 
extremely  coiltroversial  issues  in  the  debate  wlietlier  to  integrate 
European labour marltets or iiot. When iii  1957 tlie Benelux coun- 
tries, Germaiiy and Fraiice joiiied  Italy to built together tlie origiilal 
Europeail  Ecoiioinic  Coininuiiity  (EEC),  tlie  Gei-iiians aild  Freiich 
were afraid of being overflowed by Italiaiz guest workers. However, 
soinething coiiipletely unexpected happelled really: Oiily for a veiy 
sliort  period  of  time  soine  Italians  went  Noi-tli  to  becoine 
"Gastarbeiters"  iii Gennany. Much more -  but relatively  still just  a 
few - Southeili Italians just  weiit  to  tlie  Sast  developing Nortliem 
Italiail  econoiiiy  aiid they  did  ilot  even tliink about  goiilg  to  other 
EEC meinber countries. When iii  1981 Greece aiid in  1986 Portugal 
and Spaiii liave becoine iiieinbers of tlie European Community (EC), 
Nol-thern European ineinber countries agairi worried about the Soutli- 
Nortli-inigration  potential. And again, Portuguese aiid Spaiiiards as 
well  as  Greeks  did  ilot  follow  coiiventional  prejudices.  They just 
stayed hoiiie aild did move Nortli only iii extreiiiely liinited numbers. 
Tlie eiiipirical experience of tlie EU gives a clear cut picture. The 
econoinies iiivolved iii tlie Coinmon Labour Market have been siiiii- 
lar eiiough to reflect  a typical H-O-S world witli relatively  similar 
productioil teclinologies. Consequently, trade and capita1 flows have 
been rather well workiilg s~ibstitutes  for inigration. Tlie adjustinents 
towards the factor- and price equalisatioii took place above al1 via the 
trade in goods and services aiid via capita1 traiisfers, and not so iiiucli 
via the inigration of worlters. The trade in goods and tlie iiiternatioiial 
capita1 transfer reacted inuch more elastically to tlie fonnatioii of the 
Single Market thaii did the supply of labour. Tlie reduction of protec- 
tionist bai-riers led to a stroilg growth in  iiiiier-Coiiiinuiiity trade aiid 
in iniier-Coinmunity direct iiivestineiit. To a large extent the trade iii 
goods aiid capita1 traiisfers made tlie  inigratioii  of  labour uiiileces- 
saiy. Soine very briefly reported statistics might eiiforce this  state- 
ment (for details and data sources see Eurostat (2000)): 
1)  Tlie free movenieiit of persoiis is still the least used freedorn of 
the  Single  Market  iii  tlie  EU.  Less  than  2%  of  EU  citizens 
presently live in aiiother EU couiitiy. In the iininediate future it is 
therefore  less  liltely  to  be  too  much  inigration  which  causes  a 
problein  for the EU than too little, for it is becoining ever more urgeiitly iiecessaiy to open up national labour inarkets aiid in tliis 
way to overconie regional os sectoral labour niarket disequilibria. 
111  tlie  1970s  aiid  1980s  it  becaiiie  more  than  clear  that  tlie 
ecoiioniies  which  were  pai-ticulasly  successf~~l  in  coping  with 
stixictural chaiige were  tl-iose in whicli tlie  labour markets  were 
open and unregulated. Tliey were able to react more quickly and 
iiiore flexibly to cliaiiges iii the inacroecoiioiiiic eiivironment. The 
coniparisoii  of  eiiiployineiit  treiids  ii-i  the  USA and  in  the  EU 
offers  conviiiciiig  einpirical evidence iii  support of this  thesis1. 
2)  Tlie einpirical fact tliat intra-EU inigratory flows did iiot talte place 
is also astonislii~ig  because the relative welfare gap betcveen soutliem 
aiid  iiorthei~i  Europe  contiiii~es  to  be  considerable.  Per  capita 
iiicoines  adjusted  for purchasiiig power iii  Greece and Porhlgal, 
but also in Spain, were still oiily 60% to 70% of tlie incoine level 
in Gei~naiiy  iii the iiiid 90ies. Uiieinploymeiit in soutliem Europe 
has also permaiieiitly remained at a high level. For a loiig period, 
the average rate  of ~ine~iiployrne~it  iii Spain lias beeii far beyond 
20% and youth  uneinploymeiit  (persons  under 25 years of age) 
was over 50% for feinales aiid close to 40% for inales. Despite tliis 
fact there is  scarcely aiiy niigratioii froin Spain to tlie other EU 
nieinber states. It iiiight look eveii more strange that a stroiig iiiter- 
European  North-South-moveinent  lias  emerged  in the very  near 
past. Some of these inoveinents are i:ot  directly business orieiited 
and  concern  the  "Siiow  bird fliglits  froin  retired  Gerinans  to 
Spaiii (esp.  Mallorca),  Porhlgal  or  Greece.  Some  other  Noi-th- 
Soutli-iiioveinents  is related  towards  the  going  liorne  of  foimer 
emigraiits (like "Gei-inaii"  Italians goiiig back to Italy). 
Al1 migration  betweeii  the Southeni Europeaii  couiltries  aiid the 
EC-iiieinber states prior to their accession was quantitatively restricted 
aiid subject to bilateral niigratioii treaties'  just  as it is currently tlie 
case betweeii the EU aiid the CEEC. Meinbership in the EC iiivolv- 
ing tlie abolitioii of such restrictions should uiidoubtedly liave liad a 
positive  impact  on  inigratioii.  From  a  tlieoretically  point  of view, 
liowever,  it  is ~iot  coinpletely clear  whether  this  should iiievilably 
have  also  increased  Soutli-Nortli  net  migratioii  flows  resultiiig  i11 
higher inigrant stoclts. Although inost econoiiiically iiiduced inigra- 
tion  iiiodels  would  argue  i11  favour  of  increased  South-North liet 
migratioii flows (due to large iiicome differentials), there are argu- 
ineiits wliich  claim tlie  opposite: in  a poteiitially  freely accessible labour  inarltet,  fl-ee iiiobility  niight  even  encourage repatriation  of 
foreigners who would otheiwise ilot dare to leave the Iiost country for 
fear they iniglit not regain a work permit. 
Wliat does einpiricisin suggest in this respect? What migration pat- 
terns cal1 be observed before aild after tlie Soutliern EC-Eillargeinent 
(SEC)? 111 order to answer tliis q~iestioii  we study tlie developmeiit of 
inigrant  flows  and  stocks  focussiilg  oil  the  case  of  tlie  SEC  aiid 
Geilnany  0111y3  It  should iii this  context  be  Itept  iii  tiiiiid  that  tlie 
adinissioii of the  SEC was cliaracterised by a seven year traiisition 
period  (that  in  practice  lias  been  sliorteiied  to  five  years)  wliich 
allowed free inobility of labour only thereafter. Hence, Greelt work- 
ers could freely inigrate only froin  1986188 onwards, Port~iguese  and 
Spaiiish workei-s oilly after 199  111 993. 
Figure  1 shows net migration flows iiito Gerinany  iii the period 
betweeii  1967  aild  1997. Figure  2  displays  the  stock  of  Greek, 
Portuguese and Spaiiish citizens living in Geimaiiy. In the tiiile until 
the early 1970s we observe a steady inflow of inigraiits froiii al1 three 
countries  leading  to  an  overall  iiicrease  in  the  stock. Tlie positive 
slope of  the  curves  reflects  Gei~naily's  active guest  worker policy 
between  1955 aild 1973  : Gei~nany  sigiled bilateral iininigratioii con- 
tracts witli  Spain and Greece  in  1960 aiid Portugal in  1964 whicli 
provicled the basis for tlie rapidly rising inflow of foreigners4 These 
contracts, however, did iiot iinply the free iiiobility of labour. NO  for- 
eigiler could siinply coine to Gei-inaiiy aild apply for a job. The ini- 
tiative liad to be taken by Geiman einployers wlio intended to hire a 
worlter froin Southein Europe. Thus, ~nigratioii  was niaiilly deinaiid 
deterinined. Tlie sanie Itiiid of pull-inigratioil policy was applied by 
most otlier EC- member states. The begiiiiiing of tlie 1970s marked a 
turniilg point in Gerinany's iniinigration policy. In  1973 the first oil 
price shock and the resultilig recession lead to a growing labour inar- 
ket crisis. The effect was the end of the inassive reciuitinent abroad. 
Net  iiiiinigratioil flows decreased sliaiply, until  in  1974 these  even 
was a net outflow froin Geniiany. With the exceptioil of Poi-tuguese 
citizens, also tlie stock of foreigners fell. A large scale exodus of for- 
eigii worlters, however, did not take place, ilot even wlieii financial 
incentives were given iii 1983 because ecoiioinic and social prospects 
iii tlie home countries were iiot attractive at all. 
In 1988, the year in whicli tlie free inobility for Greek worlters was 
eventually perinitted,  we  observe a distinct, positive  change iii tlie 
curves reflecting net iinmigrant flows aiid stocks. Appareiitly, Greek workers used the cliaiice to go, worlc  and live abroad considerably. 
Tlie iiumber of Greeks living in  Geniiany lias been  increasiiig since 
and seei-iis to be corivergiiig to a level of about 350'000 people. 
Tlie free labour inobility betweeii Gei~naiiy  aiid Portugal as wel1 as 
Spaiii is iiot as evident: Tlie stoclt of Spanisli citizeiis iii Geriiiaiiy has 
aliiiost reinaiiled uiicliaiiged siiice the begiiiiling of tlie 90s, igiloriilg 
tlie  year  wheil  free  mobility  was  inade  possible.  The  stoclt  of 
Poi-tuguese citizeiis lias been  i11 a moderate upward  teildency siiice 
1988. Tlie stock of irnrnigrants fr-om each of tlie two countries seems 
to gradually i-iiove to a value of 130'000 people. Tlie iniportaiit year 
of  1993 does only sliow ai1 effect oii Poi-tuguese flow statistics: Net 
i~~iinig~atioii  froin Port~igal  rises by 26% in 1993 aiid ailotlier coilsid- 
erable  91% in  1994 altliough  it  again falls thereafter.  Spanisli net 
iiiigratioii  flows do not sliow any effect at al1 to tlie iiltroductioii  of 
tlie free inobility of labour. 
Siiice al1 data after 1990 concenl unified Gerinaiiy aiid data before 
1990 oiily West Geniiaily the q~iestioii  inay arise if this change inight 
have had aiiy sigiiificaiit iilfluence oii the patten1 of the curves. It is 
unliltely that tlie uilificatioii lias iiifluenced tlie stoclt observatioiis at 
all. After all, alinost i10  Soutlierii Europeans lived on tlie territory of 
tlie German Deinocratic Rep~iblic  (GDR) before 1990. Ai1 exchange 
between people of the GDR with  any of the countries of the (ideo- 
logically  despised)  westeili liemisphere  did  simply iiot take place. 
Tlie  stoclt  aiid  flow  of  inigrants  iiito  tlie  CDR  origiiiatiiig  froiii 
Greece, Portugal aild Spaiil is liltely to have been  eq~~al  or close to 
zero. Unification itself, however, inight liave slightly iiiflueilced post- 
uilificatioii iiligratioii flows. Tl-ie so-called  "Az!fiaz/  Osf" (building of 
tlie  East)  particularly  in  the  coilstruction  sector  coiitributed  to  a 
higher  deinaiid  for  worlters.  Maiiily  Pol-tuguese  worlters  were 
reported to coine to Gerinaiiy and worlc oii Easterii Gerinan construc- 
tioii sights. Tlie steady iiicrease in the stoclc of Portuguese people aiid 
the positive net iinmigratioii statistics iii tlie early 1990s inight be the 
image of tl~is  ctrongei- deinaild foi- labour. 
Suiiiiniiig up  tl~e  observatioiis froiii  the  descriptive  analysis  it  is 
possible to derive tlie following points: (i) Although tlie uiirestricted 
inobility of worltei-s lias not been allowed uiltil 1988 aiid 1993 i-espec- 
tively, bilateral contracts liave  lead  to consider-able net  iiiiinigration 
before tliese dates already resulting in larger stocks of iiiiiiiigraiits. (ii) 
Strong politica1 iiltei-veiltion in the inigration policy (as in the 60s aiid 
70s) have increased tlie magnitude of flows in botli ways (im~nigra- tioii aiid einigratioii). (iii) The stocks of foreigilers seein to approach 
sorne kind  of loiig lui1  equilibriuiii  level. (iv) Tl-ie  free inobility  of 
labour  generates  migration  flows  w1iicl.i  are  inuch  more  balanced 
(sinaller amplitude) i.e. i~iiniigratioil  almost equals e~iiigration.  Thus, 
in  an integrated labom- niarket, the inobility of people rather follows 
tlie pattein of inutual excliaiige than of olie-sided iinniigratioii. 111 this 
context  it  should  ilot  be  forgotten  that  inutual  exchange  coiicei~is 
maiiily  Southei-ii Europeaii  citizens.  Tliose  w110  iinmigrated  int0 
Geiliiaiiy were couiiterbalanced by their fellow co~iiitiyi~ieii  w110  eini- 
grated froin Geimaiiy back to their lioiiielaiid. Flows of Gelman citi- 
zens migrating int0 the Soutli liave been a ratlier rare iiicideiit. 
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tive costs of inigratioti as far outweigliiilg any expected ecoiioinic gaiiis 
(higher  net  present  value  of  expected  eainings),  witli  social  aspects 
(loss  of integration in cliangiilg place  of  resideilee),  culkisal  factors 
(adjustiiig to new habits  aiid custoins in a different enviroiiineilt) aild 
political inotives (loss of soine political votiiig rights) being particularly 
iinportailt. Apart from a few  exceptioilal eveiits these has been  little 
fluctuation  in  intra-European  inigratioil  flows  d~iriiig  the  last  tliii-ty 
years. A inajor part  of migration witliin  the Coinmoil Labo~ir  Market 
was inade up by individuals decidiiig to inigrate regardless of any eco- 
i~oinic  coilsideratioils deteriniiled by busiiless cycle Iluctuations. 
1)  Tlie free move~neiit  of worlters did not initiate large iiliier-E(E)C 
inigratory inovenients. EC os EU citizens preferred to live in their 
hoii~e  country,  even if wages were  higher in other EC iueinber 
states. Neither the considerable iiliier-EU welfare gap iil individ- 
ual purchasiilg power nor large differences in unei~iploymeiit  rates 
succeeded in creatiilg strong iiiceiitives for cross-border migratio11 
witliin tlie EU from southei~i  to noi-therii Europe. 2)  Sociological  and psychological factors at the individual  level  as 
wel1 as social, cultural  and laiiguage differences betweeii horiie 
couiitry  aiid host  coiiiiti-y reriiained  stroiig baniel-s to  inner EU- 
migration. At  the  macroeconoii~ic  level  the  cross-border iiiove- 
ineiits of worlters withiii the EC were detei-miiied by tlie require- 
inelits  aild  tlie  eiiiployi~ieiit  opportunities in tlie  host  couiitries. 
The abolishtiieiit  of foniial obstacles to iiiobility does iiot neces- 
sarily guaraiitee that tlie kiiowledge  aiid abilities of the worlters 
williiig to inigrate coi-respond to the requireiiieiits aiid deinands of 
tlie potcritial  eiiiployers. lt sliould be recalled liere that EU fiee- 
dom  of  iiioveiiieiit  does  iiot  apply  to  tlie  uneinployed. 
Uiieriiployed  persoiis  inay  loolc  for  eiiiployment  in  otlier  EU 
couiitries aiid they  inay enter  otlier ineiiiber  states foi- tliis pur- 
pose, but tliis does not entitle them to any tlilancial support wliat- 
soever from tlie (teiiiporary) host country5 
Wliat we defiiiitely iniglit  learii from the Europeaii  empirica1 evi- 
deiice is tliat iintiiobility has a certaiii positive econoinic value (see 
Fischer  (1999)).  It  allows  people  to  use  tlieir  specifically  local 
línow-liow for eariiiiig an iiicoine !i.e.  riiairilv on the laho1.1r inarket! 
and for spendiilg that iiicoine (coiisuinptioil decisioiis). This specif- 
ically local luiow-how caiiiiot be transfei-red. It would be lost in tlie 
case of migration and would liave to be acquired once more at tlie 
iiew place of residence. A f~lrtlier  advaiitage of immobility lies iii 
the optioii value of waiting. Aiialogue to iilvestnieiit  decisioils on 
finaiicial inarltets, waitiiig (i.e. not to inigrate bul- to stay) has a pos- 
itive option value6 Tliis  positive  optioii value  arises  because tlie 
postponemeiit of tlie inigratioii decisioil until later reduces the rela- 
tive uncertainty  alid  therefore tlle  risk  whicli  is involved  iii  tlie 
iiiigratioii decision. The period of waiting caii be used to gaiii infor- 
ination. This reduces the risk of a wrong decisioii. If during the 
period  of  waiting  the  differeiices  iii  incoiile  betweeii  the  hoine 
regioii aiid the potential Iiost regioii dil~iinisli,  the actual iiiigration 
flow wil1 be inuch  sinaller tlian  originally plaiiiied7 Precisely tl~is 
value of iiiiinobility explains why iiiost people prefer to stay even 
if "go"  seems to be ai1 attractive alternative at tlie tlrst glance. For 
i~iost  people,  however,  tlie  second glance clearly  shows that  the 
value of iininobility is higlier tlian the expected liet present value of 
a iiiove abroad. Consequeiitly, it is a very rational individual behav- 
iour to stay. V.  A CLOSER LOOI< AT  THE EU SOUTH ENLARGEMENT" 
A more cal-efi~l  aiialysis of the inigration  expei-ieiice after tlie Soutli 
Enlargemeiit  of tlie EU might give at least soine additioaal iiisights. 
Several  exogeneous  variables  might  be  iisefi~l  in  explaining  the 
iiiigration pattems in tlie case of Soutlieril Europe. They reach froii~ 
siiiiple wage differentials, uiieinployiiieiit  rates and traiisactioii  costs 
to more sopliisticated factors sucli as job  specific aspects, iilterteiii- 
poral  expectatioiis, attitudes  of inigraiits  towards  risk, job  findilig 
probabilities,  tiiiie  prefereiice  rates,  imperfect  iiifoi~nation,  popula- 
tioii  densities  aiid  etliiiic  aiid  iiiforinatio~i iietwoi-lts. Partly  it  is 
assuined tliat the lagged or predicted forin of these factors is req~~ired 
iii order to tlieoretically explaiii today's inigratioii. So far so good. It 
frequeiitly, however, liappeiis that practica1 i.e. empirica1 iiiodels dif- 
fer some good deal froin their theoretica1 co~iiiterpasts.  This is ofteii 
due to the fact tliat tlie precise q~~antificatioii  of soine of the iiidepen- 
deiit variables  is  rather  difficult  or that  statistica1 data  about tliein 
does siinply not exist. Iii fact for quite a few of tlie factors mentioned 
above this is the case. 
In what follows. 1 estimate  a pooled tiine  series.  cross  sectioiial 
model of bilateral iiiigratioii Ilows from each of the tlwee  Soutlieni 
European  couiltries  Greece,  Portugal  aiid  Spaiii  iiito  each  of  tlie 
Nortliei~i  EC-ineinber countries9 Oiily  those  intra-Europeaii  inigra- 
tioii flows are beiiig coiisidered which existed after tlie uiirestricted 
inobility of labour between tlie South aiid tlie North had been made 
possible. In al1 three cases of eiilargeinent tliis was seveii years after 
admission to the EC i.e. for Greece froin  1988 aiid for Poi-tugal aiid 
Spaiii  froin  1993 oiiwards.  In  the  specificatioii  of  depeiideiit  and 
iiidepeiideiit variables as wel1 as our f~inctional  forin I follow inost 
otlier recent einpirical iiiodels: 
+  P, log (44s l'  )-,  + Pi  log( D'" ) +  L,, 
wliere r.iiigrnte is tlie respective inigration rate, log is the iiatural log- 
arithin, p are the coefficieiits, J> is per  capita iiicoine, UE is uiiein- 
ployineilt rate, MS  is stock of inigraiits, D is distaiice, z1  is the en-or tem,  11  is the Nortliei~i  couiitiy superscript, ,r is the Soutliei-ii couiitiy 
superscript  aiid  t  is tiine  period. EQ. 1  suggests that  tlie  estiiiiated 
coefficielit  values  iinply  ai1  aggregatioi~  of botli, tlie  einigratioii as 
w-el1 as tlie iiiiiiiigration region. 
I ain aware of tlie fact tliat  a pooled cross sectioiial, tiine series 
ecoiionietric estimate caii lead to so-called "couiiti-y clusters" wliich 
would ratlier  suggest tlie  use  of tlie paiiel  inethod with  iiidivid~ial 
couiltry  iiitercepts (fixed  effects) os varyiiig paraineter  values,  os 
botli.  Paiiel  estiinatioiis  are,  however,  iiot  applicable in  our  case 
siiice  it  is  iny  iiiteiition  to  obtaiii  estiinates  for two  aggregated 
regioiis oiily i.e. the SEC as tlie einigratioii regioii aiid the EC as the 
iminigration region. Tlius, country specific effects would not be  of 
aiiy  use.  Tlie  probleiii  of  country  clusters  could  alternatively  be 
tackled by suiiiiiiiiig up tlie einigratioii or the iiiiinigratioii countries 
to olie regioii prior to tlie estiinatioii. Due to the fact that this would 
reduce  tlie  nuinber  of  observations  and  coiisequeiitly  als0  the 
degrees of freedoin considerably, I have abstained froin this proce- 
dure. 
Tlie dependent variable oii tlie left hand side is the bilateral rate of 
iiiigration  takiiig  place  betweeii  einigratioii  country s  (South)  aiid 
iininigration couiltry  11  (Nortli) iii time period t. It is expressed as a 
rate  siiice  it  ineasures  the  percentage  of  tlie  absolute  iiuinber  of 
inigraiits  on the total population  ili  s,  (inig""1pop".  Tlie  inodel  is 
being  estiiiiated  twice using  two  differeiit  foilns  of tlie  dependent 
variable. Iii a first estimate I use SEC'ernigratio~i  ~wte  aiid iii a sec- 
oiid  estiinate  SEC' net migrotion rate. With  this  differentiatioii an 
idea  about  tlie  relatioiiship  aiid  differing  inagnitude  of  absolute 
iiiigratioii rates to liet migration rates is obtaiiied. 
Al1 independent variables are specified iii logarithiiis. In clioosiiig 
this f~~iictioiial  forin I talte iiito consideration that a liiiear fuiictional 
forin whicli results iii a coiistaiit inargiilal propeiisity to inigrate will 
lead  to  an  overestiination  of  inigratioii poteiitials  aiid  suggests  a 
iioii-liiiear  patterii. A logarithiiiic relationship malces  seiise because 
it is realistic to assuine that tlie ainount of push inigratioii will iiot 
rise  linearly  with  increasing  values  of  tlie  iiidepeiideiit  variables. 
Tliis iiiiplies tliat free inigratioii follows some kind of saturation pat- 
tern. These is ai1 upper thi-eshold which free iiiobility will iiot SLIS- 
pass. 
The ,fir*st teiln oii tlie right haiid side (r.1i.s.) is tlie intercept tei-in. 
The secolid r.h.s. variable is tlie logarithm of tlie differeiice of rela- tive per capita iiicoine, y, to y,,, of the pi-evious tiine period, t-l. It is 
a proxy for differing wages and wealth expectatioiis betweeii s aiid li. 
The larger it is, tlie greater is tlie iiicome differeiice of couiitry s coin- 
pared to n. Large iiicome differeiitials should liave a positive influ- 
eiice o11  iiiigratioii iiito n so that tlie coefficient should be positive. 
The thir-d r.1i.s variable is tlie logarithin of tlie unemployinent rate of 
n relative to that of s of tlie previous period. The theoiy suggests that 
liiglier relative uiien~ployinent  possibilities in the iiiiinigration couii- 
try deter people from iiniiiigratiiig. Tlie coefficient should therefore 
be iiegative. Tlie,fozi~~fh  r.1i.s. variable is tlie logaritlim of past period's 
stock of inigrants froin s living iii 11. Iii fact, this variable includes the 
stock of foreign or foreigii-bolli population froin origiii couiitry s. It 
has beeii included in order to estiinate inigrants' network effects. Tlie 
more iininigraiits live iii a particular couiitry tlie n~ore  likely it is that 
they drag fiirther iiniiiigraiits into that couiitry. We should thus expect 
a positive coefficient for this variable. The Jiftth  r.h.s variable is the 
absolute distance betweeii  the capitals  of  s and iilOThe distance is 
assumed to be a proxy for transport and traiisaction costs of inoving 
as well as cultural differeiices betweeii two couiltries. The fact that 
traiisportatioii costs iiicrease witli distaiice is obvious. Nevertheless it 
is  also  liltely  that  cultural  differeiices  increase  with  distance. Tlie 
financial burdeii of iiioving as well as the cultural strangeness of tlie 
iininigration  couiitry  are  assunied  to  liave  a  iiiigratioii  rediicing 
effect. Hence, a negative coefficient is likely to exist. Finally, the last 
r.h.s. tenn is the white noise disturbance term. 
For tlie estiruations the foilowiilg yenrly data liave been used: 
Bilatcral flows of foreigilers " 
1  Pop~llation  iil potential iininigratioi~  country " 
Gi-oss doinestic product per capita i11 botli couiltries " 
Populatioil deilsity i11 both countrics " 
,  Uilemployrilciit rates in botli co~iritries  " 
'  a  Stock of foreigii or forcign bom pop~ilatiori  iii iinmigratioii couiltry " 
Absolute distance betweeil countrics' capitals 
I SO,IIY.L'S:  l 
c'  OECD SOPEMI liltemational  Migratioii Slatistics Database (various iss~ics). 
1  "  Eurostal  Luxeinbourg,  Rcgioi~al  Statistics  (REGIO)  fouiid  on  tlic  Iiitemational  1  Statistical Yearbook CD-ROM  1998. Apart froiii tlie distaiice whicli  does iiot change, al1 iildepeiideiit 
variables liave been  lagged by  one period. This lias  been  done iii 
order to model a iiiigrants' decisioii maltiiig process. The individual 
judgemeilt  wlietliei- to stay os to iiiove abroad is iioriiially iiot an ad 
lioc  decisioii  where  preseiit  variables  are  talteil  int0  accouiit.  It 
ratlier is a longer-term process wliere  expectatioiis  about poteiltial 
costs and benefits are foriiied by cal-ef~llly  evaluatiilg past  iiicoiiie 
and  expeilditure  experieiices  aiid  establishiiig  ties  to  existilig 
inigraiit iietworks. 
1. Parameter Values 
Table 1 sliows tlie regressioii results of Eq. 1 using tlie two differ- 
eiit  depeiideiit  variables.  Table  1  (A)  displays  the  results  usislg 
SEC' ernigrntion mte as a depeiident variable. Al1 coefficieiits liave 
tlie expected signs. Siiice al1 iiidepeiident  variables are defined iii 
logs aild the depeiident variable is iiot, tlie estiination's coefficieilts 
reflect senii-elasticities. Coefficieiit B, implies tliat a 10% iiicrease 
in this years  difference of relative per capita incoiiie will, ceteris 
paribus,  result  iii  iiext  years  increase  of  net  inigratioii rate  into 
country n by approximately 0,04 percentage poiiits. BI is significant 
at  a  95%  coiifidence  iiiterval.  With  a  relatively  higli  value  of 
B,=0,39  aiid the fact that the coefficieiit is sigiiificaiit, "differeiitials 
iii relative per capita iiicoiiie"  tuni out to be the iiiost  iiiiportant 
iiidepeiideiit variable  iii this  estiinate.  Coefficient P,,  iii  coiitrast, 
displays a iiegative sigii iiidicating that a 10% iiicrease iii the rela- 
tive uiieinployineiit  rate leads to  a reduction  in tlie  net inigratioii 
rate by 0,005 percentage  points. P,  is sigiiificaiit  at a 95% coiifi- 
deiice iiiterval. Coefficieiit P,  is also sigiiificaiit expressiiig tlie idea 
tliat each 10% additional foreign resideilts  iii iminigratioii country 
11  lead to networl< effects wliicli eiiliaiice liet migratiosi in tlie con- 
secutive  period  by  0,007  perceiitage  poisits.  Finally,  distaiice 
appears to liave a iiegative effect oii net inigratioii. Each 10% addi- 
tional distaiice leads to a reduced liet iiiigration rate of 0,006 per- 
centage poiiits altliougli tliis coefficieiit turiis out to be insigiiificaiit 
at a 5% sigiiificance level. I tested for the joiiit significaiice of the 
coefficieilts using the F-statistic. All four coefficieiits  appeared to 
be joiiitly significaiit. Table  1(B) shows the i-egressioii results usiiig SEC'  net ~nigr-nfioli 
r-nte as depeiideilt variable. Al1 independent variables as well as tlie 
fiiiictional  foim reinain uiicliaiiged. The sigils of al1  coefficieilts are 
coil-eet just  as inucli as iii the previous estiinates. Witliout exceptioii, 
al1 coefficient values are smaller. Now, oiily P,  and P,  are sigiiificaiit 
at  a  5%  sigiiificaiice level. All  otlier coefficients  aiid the  intercept 
terin are iiisignifïcaiit. It looks lilce relative uiieinployineiit rates were 
not very iinpoi-tant i11  detennining tl~e  liet inigration rate. 
Al1  in  all, estiiilations fl-oin this  second regressioii  are a weaker 
foi~n  to the  foi~iier  estimations. This  is  iiot particularly  surprisiiig 
siiice tlie depeiident variable also taltes smaller values. Additionally, 
rehirii inigratioii froin tlie EC to the SEC wliich is iinplicitly included 
iii liet inigratioii rates must be deteriniiled by  other tliail  ecoiioinic 
factors. 111  view of this, sinaller coefficieilt values  and the insignifi- 
caiice  of  the  uiieinployinent  parameter  seeiii  to  make  seilse.  The 
sinaller iinportaiice of econoinic deterininailts is also  s~ipported  by 
tlie sigiiificailtly lower values of R? aiid adjusted R':  The explanatory 
power is reduced by alinost 40%. 
I also tried to iiiclude a variable iiito both  estiinates iiiteiiding to 
quantify the conceiitratioii of people in a couiitry proxying tlie recep- 
tivity of irnmigrants. TIiis was done by usiiig data on populatioii den- 
sities (followiilg tl~e  exalnple of Baiï-o/Sala-i-Martin  (1995)) iii eini- 
gration  as  well  as  immigratioii  regions.  Population  density  was 
ineas~ired  as the average nuinber of iiihabitaiits per square lcilometre. 
The larger its values in the potential iininigratioii couiitry, tlie lower 
could the receptivity of f~irtlier  inigraiits be assuiiied to be. Thus, the 
coefficieiit was expected to be negative. Althougli estimations includ- 
ing  data  oii  population  delisities  provided  a  coefficient  with  the 
expected sigil we eveiitually oinitted this variable because it lead to a 
failure of diagnostic tests. 
2.  Diagnostic Tests 
A~itoco~*ïelatior?  (serial-correlation)  ineans  that  the  disturbaiice 
terms are correlated over time, i.e. that the residuals are not rail- 
doinly distributed. It  caii lead to  ai1  iilvalidatioii  of tlie  standard 
errors  aiid  t-ratios  altliough  coefficieilts  inay  be  unbiased. 
However,  it  is  iiot  possible  to  test  for autocorrelatioii  since tlie 
residuals  inay either stein fro~n  a  cross sectional  01-  alternatively 
froim  a tiine series observation. Therefore, the results are based on TABLE 1 
Regi.essioii Resli1i.s SEC ' hfi:,i.trfiori  Rrrfe.~ 
j  Dcpcildeilt variablc:  Eiiiigatioii rate,"" 
a  Observatioiis: 32 
iiitercept  P, =  -1,29  -2,93 
log( 1  -(y5/y"])  1.1  PI =  0,39  6.62 
log(UEn/UE" ),,  P? =  -0,051  -2,82 
lo&(MSn)  ,.l  Pi =  0,066  9,64 
10g(D"~)  P4 =  -0,062  -1,02 
-- 
F-statistic  34,04 
R'  0,84 
Adj. R'  0,81 
S.E. of regressioii  0,05 
Durbin-Watson  2,06 
.Cm17rr.  nw:i r?til?:?t!rn: 
(B) Estzi?iat~on  oj SEC'Net Eìn7grnf/oii Rnfe (I~iclzides  Return Mrgratron) 
:  Dependerit variable:  Net inigration ratc,"." 
I  Observatioils: 32 
l 
l 
i Indep. Variables  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
l 
j  iiitercept  Po =  -0,42  -],l8 
! log( 1  -(yq/y"))  1.1  PI =  0,17  3,55 
i log(UEn/UE")  ,.l  Pz =  -0,016  -1,ll 
i log(MSn) ,,  Pi =  0,023  4,13 




S.E.  of regressioil 
Durbin-Watson 
.--p 
Sozii.ce: Owii esli~iiutioiis tlie hypotliesis that  tliere  is  i10  time  dependeiit correlatioii  i11  the 
residuals. We  tested  for heter*oscednstic~tj~  wliich  exists wheii the 
variaiice  of  tl-le  disturbaiice  terin  11,  is  iiot  constaiit.  Heterosce- 
dasticity poses  a problein since it  leads to biased  standard errors 
aiid t-ratios. Tlie coefficient estiinates, however, inostly  coiitiiiue 
beiiig  unbiased.  Applying  White  S.  Heter-oscen'nsticity  Test  (see 
White  (1980)  817-838)  we  fouiid  out  that  our  disturbaiice  are 
hoiiioscedastic.  Fiiially,  we  coiiducted  a  iior-n~ality  test  wliich 
checked  whether  the  residuals  were  nortnally  distributed.  The 
Jul-qzle-Bern statzstic provided satisfactory evidence that tlie resid- 
uals were iioriiially distributed. 
VI.  WHAT COULD WE LEARN FOR THE EU EAST ENLARGE- 
MENT? 
After Helsinki  1999 aiid Nice 2000, it lias becoine clear that ten 
Eastern  European  countries  (i.e. Poland, Hungary,  Czech Repu- 
blic, Sloveliia, Slovaltia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states) 
wil1 becoine EU iiiembers. It is i10  longes a question whether but 
oiily  wheii  tliis  enlargeinent  of  the  EU  wil1  takeii  place. 
Consequently, the free moveinent of workers and of persoiis wil1 
becoine  valid - also for the citizens of the new meinber  states. 
This  legalisation  of  free  nioveinent  for  Eastern  Europeaiis  is 
regarded as a very centra1 issue. It is stressed that a "trek  west- 
wards" would be the consequeiice that places severe econoiiiic and 
virtually insurinountable politica1 straiiis on the western European 
target countries. But wliat could we learn froiii econoinic theory 
(see sectio11 11)  and froiii the previous experience of the EU (see 
sectioiis I11 to V): 
1) In the  1980s the EC was enlarged southward by  Greece (1981), 
Portugal (1986) and Spaiii (1986). At the beginiiing of the inein- 
bersliip iiegotiatioiis these southern European counti-ies were also 
far behind the EC ineiliber states iii tlieir economie development. 
Furtherinore, these couiitries had also experienced draniatic polit- 
ical chaiiges a short tiine previously. 111 Greece the military dicta- 
torship was iiot reinoved until the eiid of 1974. In Portugal it was 
the  "revolution  of  cai~~atioiis"  of  25.4.1974  wliicl~  led  to  the 
reiiioval of the Caetano regime. Spaiil's departure from the dicta- torship of Geiieral Franco did not take place until after his death 
in November  1975. In other  words, at the begiiining  of tlie  EC 
nieinbersliip negotiations at the end of tlie 1970s southerii Europe 
was also just at tlie beginning of its politica1 traiisformation from 
a long period of dictatorial-ideological doiiiinance  to democratie 
structures. 
2)  In the case of the southern  enlargement of the  EC, too, the dis- 
cussion was also dominated by misgivings about inass inigration 
froim  the  poorer  south  to  the  richer  north  of  the  EC.  Yet  tlie 
reinoval of ban-iers to iiiigratioii at the EC level was not enough 
to  overcoiiie  tlie  individual  (inicroeconoinic)  barriers.  Mass 
inigration froiii the south to tlie north did iiot take place. Instead, 
southerii Europeaii workers preferred to reinain where they were, 
despite lower wages or even unemployiiient,  rather tlian to look 
for work in other EC ~neinber  countries. This behaviour was iiiade 
possible for the  individual  worker by  tlie well  developed social 
networks. 
3)  The developiiieiit of the econoiny in tlie second half of tlie 1980s 
particularly  in  Spaiii, but also in Portugal and, in  part, in  Greece, 
shows  that  tlie  adjustments  due  to  integration  iiito  the  Single 
Market look place above al1 via trade in  goods and services and 
via capita1 transfers, and nol so inuch via tlie niigratioii of work- 
ers. The trade in goods reacted much more elastically to the for- 
iiiation of the Single Market thaii did  the s~ipply  of  labour. The 
reduction of protectioiiist ban-iers led to a stroiig growth iii imier- 
EC trade and in  inner-EC direct investment. To a large extent the 
trade iii goods and capita1 transfers made the inigration of labour 
iinnecessaiy. 
Of course it is, and reinains, speculatioii as to 11ow  far the eiiipirical 
experiences of EC  southern  enlarge~nent  are relevant to EU  eastem 
enlarge~nent.  Whether the  Southern  European Countries (SEC) can 
serve as ai1 aiialogy for tlie CEEC must reinain a hypothetical ques- 
tioii. Of course, tliere are iiiany important differences which can be 
found wheii coinparing these two groups of countries. After all, the 
CEEC liave been undergoing a traiisfoimatioii  process from  a cen- 
trally planned to a inarket econoiny which is uniq~ie  in  history. This 
obviously places ai1 extra burden on CEEC' economies wliicli is not 
coiisidered iii a potelitial South - East coinparisoii. Also the degree of 
proxi~nity  as well  as their cultural ties to the EU  might be distinct. Nevertlieless,  is tlie Soutliern Enlargeiiient  of tlie  EC  still the  most 
suitable and  siinilar exaiiiple  of  econoiiiic  integration  wliich  exists 
and sliall tlierefore be tlie basis in tlie descriptive as wel1 as quantita- 
live analysis. 
The estirnation  results  iii Table  1 reflect tlie patten1 of net iiiigra- 
tioii between Greece, Portugal, Spain as net emigratioii couiltries and 
the Northern EC-iiieiiiber states as typical net imiiiigration countries. 
Uiider tlie assuiiiption  of analogy between tlie  SEC aiid tlie CEEC, 
tlie obtained coefficieiit values can be used to calculate tlie aiiiount of 
rnigratioii betweeii tlie CEEC and tlie EU (extrapolation). Therefore, 
the following results have to be iiiterpreted as projections aiid nol as 
forecasts. To iiiake tliis point very clear: Tlie following projections do 
iiot  predict  tliat  tlie  projected  iiiigration  flows  will  taken  place. 
Actually, 1 do nol even indicate a probability to wliicli tlie estiiiiatioiis 
will become reality. My results are pure siinulations. Tliey have to be 
inter-preted as follows: ,,Let  21s asszlrne that the GDP per capita gap 
between the CEEC aiid the EU is 40, 50, 60 or 70%, what migratior? 
,flows shoz~ld  we then expect'?" 
It is  iinportant to keep in  iiiind tliat  al1 results iinplicitly  assuine 
that (i) the Southern European countries are exeiiiplary for tlie CEEC 
and tliat (ii) free inobility of labour between CEEC aiid the EU does 
exist".  Siiice the supposed econoiiiic coiiditioiis inore or less reflect 
tlie  curreiit  ecoiioinic  situation, our calculations siinulate the  hypo- 
thetical  situation of tlie  CEEC becoiniiig  a iiieiiiber of the  EU  and 
pel-initting the free rnobility of labour today. 
A.  Migration Rates 
Coiiipleinciltary  to  tlie  two  regressioiis  undertalteii  above, we  also 
obtain two sets of extrapolation results displayed in. Tlie tlrst reflects 
CEEC' ernigr*atioiz rates  (A), tlie second reports Met  migr"ation rates 
between tlie CEEC and tlie EU (B). 
Both tables calculate the respective values for tlie CEEC-EU (net) 
inigratioii rates. Tlie four rows differ  iii tliat tliey conteiiiplate differ- 
ent values  for incorne u'zfl&r*eiztial,s  betweeii the CEEC aiid tlie EU. 
Wliereas  i-ow  (I)  assurnes  an  incorne  differeiitial  of  "only"  40% 
betweeii tlie  CEEC aiid the EU, row  (4) calculates with a value of 
coiisiderable  70% (tlius tlie  CEEC are believed  to have a very low 
iiicoiiie coinpared to tlie EU). Witli rising  incoiiie  differeiitials  we 
also obtaiii increases of inigratioii rates. TABLE 2 
E.~/r~irpolrrtiotr  qf'CXEEC'-EU Migrrrtiorl  Rtrlrs 
(Ai  C'1XC'-EU Errri,~i.trtio~r  Krrles (IC'i/lrori/  Kerrrrn hki-trtiori) 
ratc 
('la  %l  of 
pop~ll'itloi1  lil 
CEEC) 
(1)  O, l 9 
. -~~p  -~  ~- 




(UP)  , , : 10,5% 
(UI?),,:  15% 
(MS"),., .  1 000 000 
Sliadcd arca: Ciii-reilt iiicotiic differeritials. 
D>l!r.c.<,.  niyn  ~r!i.~!l:itio~,u 




I atc (as % of 
pop~~latioii  i11 
.--  - .. . 
CEEC) 
(Ut?"), , : 10,5% 
(UE'),,: 15% 
(MS"), , : 1  000 000 
1  /  (D"')  1  500 kiii As  can  be  seeii  iii  Table  2(A),  CEEC'  einigratioii  rates  vary 
between  0.19%  aiid  0,40%  of  its  ~?opulatioii  del?eiidiiig oii  whicli 
iiicoine scenario we coiisider in the calculatioiis. It is evident tliat this 
is quite a large range of eiiiigration potential. Statistical data suggests 
a cui-rent average incoine differential between t11e  EU  and the CEEC 
of roughly 55%. Heiice, rows (2) and (3) calculating wit12  ai1  incoiiie 
differeiitial of approxiinately 50-60% retlect tlie actual iiicome differ- 
eiice betweeii the  CEEC aiid the  EU  tlie best. Poteiltial emigratioii 
rates  sliould  consequently  lie  soinewhere between  0,27-0,34%  of 
CEEC' popiilation p.a. 
Table 2(B) displays tlie calculated net iiiigration rates between the 
CEEC and the EU resultilig from our extrapolations. All  inigratioi~ 
rates are substaiitially lower tliaii iii part (A) of the table siiice tliey 
implicitly  include retui-ii inigratioii of CEEC-citizeiis. Focussilig oii 
tlie  actual  incoine  differeiitials  in  rows  (2)  and  (3) we  obtaiii  net 
inigration rates of 0,l-0,13% of CEEC' populatioii p.a. 
Altogether,  our  calculations  advocate  that  there  would  be  liet 
iinmigratioii fiom the CEEC into the EU if free inobility of labour 
betweeii  tlie  CEEC  aiid  tlie  EU  was  permitted.  Tlie  substaiitially 
sinaller values  of net inigratioii  rates coinpared  to pure  einigratioii 
rates  suggests that there would  be  a coiisiderable aiiiouiit of retiirn 
inigration. Thus, people would return back hoine aller a certain tiine 
period living and working inside tlie EU. 
It is liltely, however, that tlie calculated iiiigration rates in  Table 
2(A)+(B)  curreiitly  still  underestiinate  potential  free  inigratioii 
tlows  originating  froin  CEEC.  Siiice  tlie  CEEC  have  still  not 
reached  ai1 eq~iivalently  high  ratio of inigrant stoel< in  the EU  as 
tlie  SEC, it  is probable that irnmigratioii  i-Yoin the CEEC would 
initially be larger. Also retzirn migration being iinplicitly included 
in net migration rates will only be of significance if there is a suf- 
ficiently large stock of CEEC iiiigrants liviiig in  the EU  already. 
As  long  as  this  long-run  equilibrium  stock  of  inigraiits  is  not 
reached,  it  is  liltely  that  liet  iininigratioii  is larger  tlian  wliat  is 
suggested by tlie estilnates. In otlier words, the CEEC-EU inigra- 
tioii patterii will reseinble the calculated coefficieiits more closely 
as s0011 as CEEC' inigrant stock has piled up to a ratio equivalent 
to tliat  of the  SEC (rouglily  3% of the pop~ilation).  Hence,  the 
calculated inigration rates sliould be uiiderstood  as long run val- 
ues.  In  the  short ruil,  tliey  caii  rather  be  interpreted as a  lower 
threshold . B. Absolzrte Nzmiber- of'  Migrmits 
In a iiext step I talte the extrapolated values of inigratioii rates fro~n 
Table 2 aiid eiiiploy thein o11 tlie arnouiit of populatioii iii the CEEC 
(usiiig the  1997 data). The outcoliie is ai1 estiinate of the iiiagiiihlde 
of CEEC' migration  iilto tlie  EU  (Table  3). Again  we  differeiitiate 
between pure e~iiigration  (part A) aiid net inigration (part B). 
The calculations in Table 3(A) advocate tliat under tlie assuinption of 
ar1 EU-CEEC iilcoiile differential of 50-60% and igiloriilg retuni niigra- 
tion, approximately 270'000 to 340'000 iiiiiiligrants p.a. would be iiiov- 
ing froin the CEEC int0 the EU if free niobility of labour was permitted. 
With progressive incoine coiivergence push niigration froin tlie C,EEC 
would decrease over tiine. As soon as we incoiporate rehlni migratioii 
iiito our calculatioiis, we obtain a inagilitude of net migratioii of approx- 
iinately 99'000-129'000  people froin CEEC as TABLE  3(B) illustrates. 
TABLE 3 
Exti~rrpolntroi7  of  the CEEC-EU 12//agnrfz/de  of~bfzgi.atioï~ 
(A) Magnztzr~Je  oj CEEC Einigrrrtioii to EU 
I (Sceilaiio) Ii~coiiie  Differentlal  1  Magnitude of Miglation 
(1)  40%  1  188 100 
Sliaded area: Curreiit iilcome differeiitials 
Sollire: Owil calc~~latioils. 
(B) Mi1giiztze of  CEEC Nel Migrat~oiz  to EU 
(li7cl~i~Je~  Ret~/,i?  1Migrntroi7) 
S~pposcd  populdtion in CEEC  99 000 000 
4 
(Sceilaiio) Iiicoine Diffeieiltial  ÏVlagilit~ide  of  Migiatioil  7 
, 
)(l)  40%  1  59 400 
Shadecl area: Cui~ciit  iilcoi~ie  differeiitials 
Soliire: Ow11 calculations. The findings froin our extrapolations are illustrated in Figure 3. 011 
tlie x-axis we have depicted a whole range of different iiicoine scenar- 
ios ranging froin relatively hoinogeneous 1 5%  incoine differeiltials to 
a very heterogeileous 75% ceteris paribus. The ceteris paribus assullip- 
tioii iinplies that al1 other variables (rineinployine~it,  stock of inigrants 
and distance) reinaiil unclianged. The y-axis outliiies tl~e  correspoiid- 
iilg ainouilt of iliigratioii p.a. The first curve displays tlie pure ernigra- 
tioii poteiltial froin the CEEC and is based oil the coefficient values 
froin  Table  l(A). Tlie  secoild  cuive  focuses  o11  the  ilet  inigration 
poteiltial con-espondiiig to Table 1(B). It is interestilig to see tliat emi- 
gratioii fi-om the CEEC cal1 even turn negative (i~nplying  net iminigra- 
tion to tlle CEEC) as soon as we get close os below income differen- 
tials of about 25%. Incoine iilceiltives in the EU would in such a case 
not be high enougli in order to attract a larger n~imber  of CEEC citi- 
zeils. Their retuin inigratioil would tlien surpass tlie einigration flows. 
As I inentioiled previously, the amouiit of rehini migration is lilcely 
to  be  overestiinated  for the  CEEC as  loilg as  the  stock of  CEEC 
migrailts has not reached its long nin level. Hence, return inigration 
wil1 initially lie soinewhere between zero (iinplying that these is only 
emigratioil from the CEEC) and the amount wliich is iinplicitly sug- 
gested by the estiinated parailleter  values of net inigration. The two 
illustrated curves in Figure 3 could then be iilterpreted as a coi-ridor 
FIGURE 3 
CEEC'Em~gratiori  nnd Net Migration Potei7tial 
1  x Migration  n Net Migration , displaying  potential  liet  migratioli  ~vliicli,  depending  oii  tlie  i-eal 
degree of return iiiigratioii, is bounded  oii one side by tlie curve of 
liet inigration aiid bouiided  oii tl~e  otlier side by tlie curve of einigra- 
tioii. I-lence, we inight  see our coefficieiit values as a lower aiid ai1 
upper extreilie sce~lario  of potential CEEC-EU liet inigratioii. 
Depeiidiiig on the degree of return i~iigratioii  our results suggest that 
between  100'000 aiid 340'000 i~iigraiits  p.a. would be  nioviilg from 
tlie CEEC into the EU  oil a net basis if tlie free inobility  of labour 
was peniiitted. At  first  sight, tliis  ainouiit of aiiiiual liet  inigratioil, 
particularly  the upper threshold, seenis to  be  a  lot. Tliere are two 
poiiits wliich should be ineiitioiied in this coiltext. Firstly, it should be 
inade clear for whoin this is a lot of net inigratioil. For an inimigra- 
tioii region lilce the EU coilsistiilg of 380 inillioii iiihabitants, the cal- 
culated net inigratioii flows would accnie to 0,0003-0,0008% of the 
populatioii  oiily,  depeilding  on  tlie  assuined  sceiiario.  Effects  of 
inimigratioii are then likely to be rather sinall. For the CEEC as a liet 
einigratioii region, a deparhire of 0,l-0,34% of its populatioii would, 
in coiitrast, be quite substantial ilot to say l~ariiifiil. 
Secoiidly,  the  parameters  applied  iil  these  calculatioiis  were 
clerived froiil tlie Soutliem Europeaii experieiice iii the first few years 
after free labour iiiobility was peili~itted.  It is possible tliat the inigra- 
tion perfoilnaiice in these first years was in soine way excessive aiid 
not really representative for the loiiger luil. It is a bit lilte with a child 
which lias ilever been allowed to eat cliocolate. 111  tlie first few days 
after  per~iiissioii,  tlie  cliild  wil1  eat  inucli  more  chocolate  thaii  it 
would uiider regular circuilistances do. Maybe migrailts behave sim- 
ilarly.  The  sudden freedoili  iiiight  induce  inaiiy  iliore  ~iiigrai~ts  to 
inove  tlian  would  under  ilormal  circumstailces  do.  Martiii 
((1993),136) calls this ltiiid of migratory pattei-n tlie  "hun-  gffecf". 
Aftei- ai1 ~iiii-easonable  initia1 period of stroiig ii~iinigratioii,  liet inigra- 
ti011 flows decrease thereafter. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
The einpirical experience of the EU is largely in accordance with the- 
oretical  expectations. Tf  labour  is legally  free to move, this  iiialtes people (especially in border areas) iiiore inobile iiitei~iatioiially:  but it 
does iiot in itself iiiduce niass inigratioii fi-oiii olie country to aiiother. 
People's  social  aiid  cultural ties  to tlieir  local  eiiviroiiiileilt  are ai1 
iinportaiit obstacle to inigratioii whicli lias been coiiiinoi~ly  underesti- 
inated from tlie perspective of theoretica1 ecoiioiiiics. 
Iii  tlie  Commoii  Labour  Market  of  tlie  EU,  labour  lias  been 
extreinely  iininobile  iilteniationally.  Tlie  Inr-ge  mqjor-i@ of people 
want  to  live,  work  aiid  stay  iiniiiobile  where  olie  has  ones  roots. 
People  usually  prefer  the  status  quo  to  ai1  ~infainiliar  or  iiisecure 
chaiige. The siiiiple abolishineiit of legal i~iipediiiients  to inigratioii is 
usually  iiisufficieiit  to  overcoine  iiidividual  (iiiicroecoiioinic,  social 
and cultural)  obstacles to iiiigratioii aiid to overslioot the value of 
iinmobility. Contrary to wliat olie may expect at first from tlie theory 
of interiiatioiial  ecoiioinic  iiitegratioii, Europeaii labour has reacted 
little to the opportuiiity of free inoveiiieiit witliin  a coinmon labour 
inarlcet. Tbis  conclusion  caii be  draw11 with respect  to  the Nordic 
Coininon  Labour Market  as wel1 as for the  Siilgle  Marlcet  of the 
Europeaii Uiiion. Europeaii worlters prefer to  stay uneinployed at a 
certaiii locatioii. They caii afford this  strategy due to tlie relatively 
geiierous  social  nets that  as  a  tendeiicy  discriiniiiate inobility  and 
refuiid  iminobility. The  developinent  of systerns  of social  security 
aiid  welfare  allows  for iininobility  eveii  uiider  coiiditions  of  long 
terin  uneiiiployineiit. Tlie  provision  of  iilcreasingly  coinpreliensive 
social security in the EU is one of the most important factors explain- 
ii~g  the preference of iiliiiiobility. 
Oii  tlie  171acroeconomic  level  inten~atioiial  labour  inigration lias 
proved  to  be  inainly  de/nn~id-deter-17li1ied:  it  usually  depends  to  a 
major exteiit oii tlie iieeds aiid einployiiieiit opportunities iii the i171~7i- 
gr-afion  couiltries. In the EU trade has reacted iiiucli faster aiid inore 
elastically to ecoiioniic iiitegration thaii laboui: Tlie reinoval  of for- 
inal aiid  inforinal protectioiiist  iiiipedinieiits  led to a stroiig iiicrease 
in iiitra-coiiiiilunity trade. The equalisation of good aiid factor prices 
expected  oii tlie  grouiid of the neoclassic H-O-S iiiternatioiial  eco- 
noiiiic theory thus ~naterialised  througli trade ratlier thaii througli the 
iiicreased  inobility  of  labour.  To  an  irnpoi-taiit  degree,  trnde  lias 
i-eplaced rhe ec0110171ic  den7and jor-  nligi-atiori iii tlie EU. 
Ecoiioinic integration proinotes welfare. Tlie reinoval of obstacles 
to trade  aiid  the iiitegratioii  of iiiteinational  Iliiaiice  marltets  inalce 
trade in  goods and services easier aiid capita1 and know-how iiiore 
inobile iiiteinatioiially. Labour inigratioii tlius becomes increasiiigly dependent oii the progressive liberalisation of trade in goods and ser- 
vices and the international inobility of capital. More aiid inore, mlrlti- 
tzcr/iot1crl,fi1~17zs  iiiay becoiiie a key 'media' i-.or this increasi~igly  inter- 
depeiident  Ilows  of  trade,  laboui- and  capital.  Multi~iatioiial  fiiliis 
create  'internatioiial  systeins' tliat  allow clualified labour and direct 
investiiieiit  capita1 to  inove froiii  olie  intei-natioiial location  to  the 
other avoidi~ig  tlie cost of leaving tlie system. 
A  coiniiioii  econoiiiic  area  pi-iinarily  inci-eases  competition 
between iiiiinobile labour and local social and econoiiiic systems lor 
the  inobile pi-oduction i-àctoi-s of capital  aiid know-how. Locatioiis 
tliat are pai-ticularly attractive iii this respect inanage to gather highly 
sl<illed specialists. The inore tecliiiological iniiovations regardiiig tlie 
transfer  of  data,  iiifoimatioii,  goods,  services aiid  the  mobility  of 
people reduce the costs of geogi-apliical distance, the iiiore locational 
aspects of relative inacroeconomic attractiveness and iiiicroeconoiiiic 
(cost-deterinined) competitiveness inattei-. If policy inaltilig aiid iiisti- 
tiitioiis iieglect that fact, econoiiiic ageiits aiid people iii geiieral are 
bouiid to "vote by their feet" aiid move their actioii aiidlor tlieinselves 
to otlier locatioiis. 
The I-elntive  nttr-~rctivelie~s~s  of  in717zobile ~it*odzrctiotz  fLIcto1"s (whicli 
apart  froin  iininobile  labour,  invested  pliysical  capital,  locational 
bound i-esoui-ces and ini-.i-astructiire,  also include instilutional awange- 
ineiits) detenniiies to  what exteiit  inobile pi-oductioii factors iiiay be 
Icept  respectively attracted to a cei-taiii locatioii. Witliiii iiiternational 
specialisatioii aiid diversifïcatioii of labour, iiiobile factors are directed 
to tlie places at which they are inost productive aiid thus earn tlie high- 
est return. liiiiiiobile production  factors ask "what  shall we do?"  (to 
attract  mobile olies)  while  iiiobile  factors  wonder "where  shall  we 
go'?" (to geiierate tlie liigliest possible iiiarginal utility, iii co-operation 
with coinpleiiientaiy iminobile factors specific to a location). 
Iii a nutshell, the consequences of integratiiig ecoiioinies withiii a 
comiiioii labour inarket produce two aiiswers: 
l) The iiiigration of i-elatively lowei qualilled workers might follow 
a neoclassical  H-O-S pattern.  Trade and capita1 flows substitute 
soonci- oi latei- more or less the iiccd for stroiig inigration flows ot 
rather uiiskilled workei-s. It is cheaper to inove staiidardised piod- 
ucts aiid machines tlian people. 
2)  The inigration of relativcly liiglicr qualiflcd workers might follow 
the Ricai-dian (or New Growth) dynamic of a core-peripheiy pat- tei-ii. Pcople wit11 sltills aiid l<riowledgc iiiiglit go tlic centres wliat 
inalccs tliciii i~ioi-e  attractive for capital aiid skilled worlcers 111 thc 
iiext round. Ricli aggloiiicratioiis  aiid poor outbacks inight be tlie 
long teriii coiisequeiice. 
Talten  togethcr,  it  is  wortli  to  stress  olie  single  point:  111 botli 
worlds it is iiot (too inucli) iiniiiigration tliat i~~iglit  cause a "problcin" 
bilt ratlier (too inucli) ciiiigratioii! 
1.  Slaiicliard/Knt7, (1992) sliow tliat in the USA it is tlic woi.l<crs  iii particulai- wlio, by 
iiicaiis OS  iliigratioii, are rcspoiisible for tlic i-clatively rapid adjcistiiient to cliaiigcs iii 
tlic ecoiioiliic ciiviroiiiiiciit.  A11  cxogcnous sIiocl<  (growtli spurts abro~id,  sti-oiig íluc- 
tuatioiis 111 excliaiigc rales, incrcascs i11 prices of irnpoi-1s aiid raw niatct-ials. rcccssioil 
in sales outlcts) wliicli origiiially rcduccs total eiiiployiiiciit  in  r111  Aincricaii regio11 by 
l%,, leads oii avcrage to an iiicrcasc in the uiieiiiployiuciit rate of' IialS a percentage 
point aftcr two years. Aftci- six years tlie uiieinployriicnl ratc gocs down to its oiigi- 
iial Icvcl, while totul ciiiployinent is rediiccd by a frirtlier pcrcciitage poiiit coinpai-cd 
to its original levcl (i.c. Llierc is a tal1 of abo~il  2%) altogctlicr). 11 talies teil ycai-s for 
ciiiployilieiit to halancc out at a iicw ccl~iilibri~nii  level, wliicli is about  1% bclow llic 
origiiral  levcl. Howcver, is1 the USA Llie  1-2%)  oí'iliosc  origiiially cinploycd aiid wlio 
.  .  .  .  iiiivt. bccii iii>icic:  LCULLIIGLLIIL  UI)  11111 i  CIII~LIII  III LIICII ~~LC.II>LUI~L~U  jjlrl~~  ui' i~aid~lib~  ùiid 
stay iyunciiiploycd, but inovc away and fiiid pi-od~ictivc  cinployincnt i11 another region. 
Bxogciio~is  slioclis thei-cforc liardly led to aiiy permanent rise in str~~ctciral  uiieinploy- 
rnciit in Llic  regioiis of tlic IJiiilcd States. 
2.  In tlic case of Gerniaiiy lliese were gz~est  wor,ker-  Ir-etriies ciicouragiilg the iniiiiigratioii 
of bluc-collar wol-kers froii~  soutlici-n E~iropc. 
3.  We cosicentrate oii Gcrinaiiy bccausc  it has llie loligcst inigratioii tradition witli cacli 
oP tlie tliree SEC aiid data series Iiavc been iiicoiiiparably long. 
4.  Por  ai1  overvicw  about  Geiiiian  as  wel1  as  Europcaii  rnigi-atioii  p»licics  see 
Fassiiiaiin/Muiiz  (1994). 
S.  Accoi-ding to Llic  basic pi-inciplcs of social secui-ily law in the EU, cmployed pel-soiis 
are socially  iiis~ircd  i11 tlie co~i11ti.y  in wliich  tlicy  live aiid wui-k. Tlic right Lo  social 
security bciicfils can only he gaiiicd by a pcrson  wlio  Iias made payrneiits  isito thc 
social sccurity scliciiies ol'tlic host couiiti-y by bciiig cinploycci thci-c. For cxaii~plc,  iE 
a Port~ig~icse  b~iildiiig  workcr Iias woi-leed  iii <;crmaiiy and bccoiiics uiiernployed  tlicn 
he Iias cxaclly the sainc rights regarding ~inciiiployiiieiit  bciiclïls as liis German col- 
Icag~ics  wlio have also been  iiiade uiieiiiploycd.  Ile caii, howcvcr, only clniin tlicsc 
riglits  i11 Gcrinaiiy sincc tlic righl to bciidïts oiily exists in  thc country in  wliich  thc 
cmploycd persoii was las1 insured. Payiiiciit  in aiiollicr EU co~iiiti-y  is tlierelbi-e i-ulcd 
o~it  - cvcn if Iie rctariicd  to  Portugal. A "iiiigratioii  of tlic  uncriiployed"  is tli~is  pre- 
vciitcd by tlic fact tliat "iioriiially"  uncniployiiicnt beiiefits ai-c not paid in aiiotlici- Eli 
colintry. Aii  iiiieniploycd  percosi  cali  ~indcr  ccrtairi coiiditioiis  contiiirie  to  rcccivc 
~iiicinployinent  benetit  froiii liis previous cotintry of residciicc  if he Iias been  givcii 
pci-iiiissioii to  rcsidc in  ailotlier iueinbcr skate br  at most tlii-cc iiloiitlis  iii  order to 
look Tor  worlc tlicrc. Thc same priiiciplc, Lliat  social iiisui-aiicc protection only cxists 
iii Llic  country of rcsidciice and eiiiployiiicnt, also prevcnts "social  seciirity tour-isiii". 
Righls  are  based  cxcl~isively  0x1  pr-cvious  coiitributioiis.  IS  workers  Iiavc  bccn ciiiployed  iii iiioi-c tliaii oiic EU ii~ciiibcr  state iii Llie  course of tlieir lives aiid iiiade 
payiiieiits to llie social iiisiiraiice scliciiies tliere. llieii llie insuraiice clainis are in~itii- 
ally  recogiiised  so tliat  tliere are iio  gaps  iii coverage and iio  periods  of iiisuraiice 
covei- ai-e lost.  Por individual  legal  q~iestioiis  coiicci-iiing EU  ficedotii of iiioveineiil 
sec, in pal-licular. SCcliC ((1988) aiid (1994)). 
6.  011  this sec B~irda  (1995). 
7.  Tlic coiiccpt of tlic oj>tioii valuc  of inigralion  colild  he  extendcd hy tlie aspcct tliat 
peoj>le are not risk-iieiilral  hut ratlicr, teiid [o he avci-sc to risk. Tlic hii-d in  tlic liaiid 
tends  10  be giveii pre[erciice  over  tlie  two  in  tlie  husli,  aiid  a  "worsc"  alternative 
wliicli can be anticipated willi a liigli degree ~[probability  may bc preièrrcd to a "bet- 
ter"  alternative wliicli is uiicer-laiii. It is also possible tliat tlie decisioii to tiiigi-ate is 
rio1 based  oii tlie  loiig-tenii pcrspectivcs but takes placc iiistead lili- short-tcrni  rea- 
sonö. In this case tlic liigli tïxcd costs at tlic begiiiiiiiig ofiiiigi-ation caii act as a dctcr- 
i'ciit aiid hc ovci-cstiiiiatcd, alllio~igli  tlic later advanlagcs wo~ild  he iii~icli  grcntcr tliaii 
llie iiiilial costs. Both cxtciisioiis of tlie niodcl -  i-isk aversion aiid tlic prd'creiicc  foi- 
lhe slioi-t terni -  work in [avoui- of waitiiig. 
8.  This section  draws oii joint  work  witli  llubci-hls Ilille aiid  oii his disscrlatioii  (see 
llille aiid Straubliaai-  (2001) aiid Ilille (2001)). 
9.  Partic~ilarly  Belgiuni, Ileiiiiiark, Praiicc, Gei-iiiaiiy, Luxetiibouig, tlie Nethci-laiids and 
tlic Uiiited  Kiiigdom showed to Iiave an excliaiigc of labo~ir  witli tlie SEC. 
10. 'rhc distaiicc  10  Gcrniany lias  beeii  calculated hy  usiiig  tlic  city  of Fi-aril<liirt a.M. 
siiicc pi-c ~iiiilicatioii  data Iiavc also been   isc cd. 
I  I . Rciiiciiibcr tliat ccoiioincti-ie estiiiialioiis wcrc oilly abolit tlic j>ci-iod of li-ec iiiobility 
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